Toward an Understanding of Moral Judgments Concerning Violent Behavior

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14. ABSTRACT

The objective of this project was to study the mental dispositions involved in moral judgments concerning violent behaviors. More specifically, we wanted to understand why human beings sometimes judge that violence is acceptable and even obligatory, and to understand how these judgments interfere with the process of peace negotiations in the context of inter-group conflict, dealing with two cultural contexts—Northern Ireland (Protestants vs. Catholics) and South Africa (Afrikaners vs. Blacks). These contexts are interesting because there has been substantial development of a peaceful cohabitation between the two sides of the conflict but there are still radicals in the conflict, a situation that may evince important cross-cultural differences in relation to other conflict areas, such as Palestine, in relation to the way radicals reason about violence. During the first year, we proposed to refine and complete the methodology, get initial IRB approval, and start preparations for data collection. During the second year, we proposed to carry out data collection and analysis.

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Toward an Understanding of Moral Judgments Concerning Violent Behavior

Final Report for Grant 113049 (EOARD)

The general purpose of our project was to study the mental dispositions involved in moral judgments concerning violent behaviors. More specifically, we wanted to understand why human beings sometimes judge that violence is acceptable and even obligatory, and to understand how these judgments interfere with the process of peace negotiations in the context of inter-group conflict, dealing with two cultural contexts—Northern Ireland (Protestants vs. Catholics) and South Africa (Afrikaners vs. Blacks). These contexts are interesting because there has been substantial development of a peaceful cohabitation between the two sides of the conflict but there are still radicals in the conflict, a situation that may evince important cross-cultural differences in relation to other conflict areas, such as Palestine, in relation to the way radicals reason about violence. During the first year, we proposed to refine and complete the methodology, get initial IRB approval, and start preparations for data collection. During the second year, we proposed to carry out data collection and analysis.

YEAR 1

Paulo Sousa (PI) and Nora Parren (Research Assistant) delved into the existing literature and refined the project based on Scott Atran and collaborators' work on sacred values (see, e.g., Atran, Axelrod, & Davis, 2007; Ginges, Atran, Medin & Shikaki, 2007). These ideas were integrated into a new approach to the project's aim and methodology. The research would further our understanding of the relation between moral or sacred values,[1] violence, trust and religiosity in the context

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[1] Following the recent literature (e.g. Ginges & Atran, 2011; Graham & Haidt, 2010), we use the expressions "sacred values" and "moral values" interchangeably, meaning that these values are considered to be non-negotiable, at least in the great majority of circumstances.

of the conflict between Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland [between Afrikaners and Blacks in South Africa] by targeting radicals in these cultural contexts. The methodology we developed during the first year was supposed to be pursued in two complementary phases.

In the first phase, which would be more qualitative and exploratory, we would distribute a survey asking anonymous participants about what sort of values are sacred to them and to other people in Northern Ireland [or in South Africa], why they hold these values, and whether, if necessary, people would endorse violent behaviour to protect or implement their values (For the structure of the survey we developed in relation to this phase, see Appendix 1, below).[2] The main aim of the first phase would be to get a good grasp of the sacred values that are at stake in the conflict in each of the places, though we also wanted to analyze to which sort of moral domain, in Jonathan Haidt's terms, these sacred values are mainly connected (Graham & Haidt, 2012; Graham, Nosek, Haidt, Iyer, Koleva & Ditto, 2011).

In the second phase, we would distribute a conflict-resolution survey concerning hypothetical political agreements involving some of the sacred values revealed in the first phase, targeting radicals and non-radicals on both sides of the conflict. The survey is similar to ones that have been utilized in conflict areas such as Israel, Palestine (Atran, Axelrod, & Davis, 2007; Ginges, Atran, Medin & Shikaki, 2007), Indonesia (Ginges & Atran, 2009), India (Sachdeva & Medin, 2009) and Iran (Dehghani, Atran, Iliev, Sachdeva, Medin, & Ginges, 2010). Previous research has shown that there are certain asymmetries in people's reasoning about hypothetical peace deals involving sacred values. For instance, participants have been presented with two different hypothetical peace deals—one in which both their social group and the social group on the other side of the conflict would have to give up something sacred for them; another where, in addition, the social group of the participants would be offered a financial incentive. Participants tend to think that the second deal is worse than the first—the additional financial benefits seem to outrage these participants even more. Thus, they are not reasoning instrumentally in the context of conflict resolution—the additional financial benefits do not make the second deal

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[2] Because direct measures of violence endorsement are unlikely to be answered by participants because of political and legal sensitivities, we never asked participants directly whether they themselves endorse violent behaviour.

more attractive; they are rather disgusted by the suggestion that they could exchange their sacred values for financial benefits. However, when participants are presented with similar peace deals involving something that is still very important but not sacred to them, the opposite pattern of reasoning is evinced—the additional financial benefits make the second deal more attractive to them. Accordingly, our survey questionnaire would probe whether reasoning asymmetries such as this hold for the conflict between Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland [Afrikaners and Blacks in South Africa]. The main aim is to get information about the moral factors that may facilitate or hamper processes of conflict resolution (For the structure of the survey we developed in relation to this second phase, see Appendix 2, below).

Sousa and Parren also went through the literature specific to the project's field sites in Northern Ireland and in South Africa. The researchers are based in Northern Ireland and have taken advantage of this to get feedback from academics who specialize in particulars of the relevant aspects of this culture and history as well as from acquaintances who draw primarily from their own experience living in the culture and having their own family histories. In an attempt to gain some greater level of familiarity with the cultural, geographic, and historical context, as well as to get similarly useful feedback, Sousa and Parren took a trip to South Africa, primarily based in the Cape region. Despite the relative brevity of this trip, the returns were enormous. The primary approach was to speak to people through their roles in the tourism industry, as their personal backgrounds varied widely, but their familiarity and comfort in talking about South African issues with outsiders was obvious. Parren also went North to Orania, an Afrikaner radical separatist private town. The residents she encountered were very helpful and encouraged the researchers to return. Though the approach will be to recruit participants online, this site is well prepared for any follow-up work. We also recruited South African collaborators to this project. Prof. Deon Meiring is a Professor of Psychology at the University of Pretoria who focuses on values research. He has been very helpful in giving feedback about various theoretical and practical issues of research in South Africa as well as navigating issues of language that we have encountered. Meiring also has a graduate student, Jaco Theron, who has been interested in our project and who decided to supplement our study with some more qualitative work that may help explain our eventual findings.

In relation to IRB approval, the overall methodology related to both phases received *initial* ethical approval for deployment in Northern Ireland (both in Northern Ireland and in the US) but not yet for the deployment in South Africa (neither in South Africa nor in the US).

YEAR 2

Northern Ireland

In relation to phase one, we applied our questionnaire (see Appendix 1 for details) using online methods to 110 Northern Ireland participants (57 Catholics; 53 Protestants), in order to get a better grasp of the issues that are currently sacralized in the context of the Northern Ireland conflict—i.e. the conflict between Protestants and Catholics. In terms of data analysis, although the questionnaire collected a range of information about perceptions of the conflict, we focused first on the results that would allow us to implement the second phase of our project. The main results relevant for the next phase were as follows:

a) The answers of many participants suggested that the labels "Protestants" and "Catholics" are not the most appropriate for self-identification in the conflict;

b) Even in relation to the more political labels "Nationalist" or "Republican" (on the Catholic side) and "Unionist" or "Loyalist" (on the Protestant side), there are slight differences in preference for these different labels as self-identification labels in the conflict (some participants explicitly expressed a preference for one of these labels instead of the alternative one);

c) Overall, Unionists/Loyalists tend to be more radical than Nationalists/Republicans, in terms of value sacralization.[3]

d) By far, the most recurrent thing viewed as sacred by participants on both sides was the flying of their respective flags (i.e. the Union Flag and the Irish tricolor flag), probably because of the decision in December 2012 to fly the Union flag over Belfast City Hall only on certain designated days, instead of all the year round as previously, which led to protests, including various violent riots.

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[3] In terms of the emphasis in different moral domains in the sense of Jonathan Haidt (see Graham, Nosek, Haidt, Iyer, Koleva & Ditto, 2011), the initial qualitative evidence suggests that Nationalists/Republicans think more in terms of justice while Unionists/Loyalists think more in terms of group loyalty.

For the second phase, we finalized the survey questionnaire according to the results of the first phase: a) we replaced the labels "Catholic" and "Protestant" with the labels "Nationalist/Republican" and "Unionist/Loyalist; b) we gave participants more freedom in terms of self-identification; c) we focused our hypothetical political agreement scenarios on the issue related to the flying of the flags (for the details, see Appendix 2). And we applied the new questionnaire online to 910 Northern Ireland participants (344 Nationalist/Republicans, 566 Unionists/Loyalists) in order to probe the role these values play in conflict resolution and violent behavior in the context of the Northern Ireland conflict. The implementation of the second phase was delayed for various reasons, though. First, it took a while to get IRB approval in the US concerning the final changes of our original design. Second, after getting this approval, our first attempt to get participants online was not successful because many participants attempted to fraud the survey in order to be paid twice. For this reason, we contracted Qualtrics (a private research software company—see http://qualtrics.com/) to manage the application of the survey, a change that also demanded us to get an additional IRB approval in the US. However, with this approach with were successful in getting reliable data, though only by the end of November of 2013. We are now in the process of analyzing this data. Preliminary analyses show that, although there are some trends, the asymmetries in reasoning about sacred values and violence found in other conflict zones are not existent in the Northern Ireland context. For example there was no clear difference in the pattern of moral-emotional reactions, in particular anger and disgust, among radical Unionists/Loyalists between the simple taboo agreement and the taboo agreement plus financial benefits [radical = 1 (i.e. sacralize the issue); Non-radical = 0 (do not sacrilize the issue)]:

radical * Emotion2 Crosstabulation

Count

		Emotion2										Total
		humiliation	pride	sadness	happiness	dissatisfaction	satisfaction	digust	guilt	anger	neutral	
radical	0	2	5	9	7	4	10	7	2	6	11	63
	1	9	3	18	2	16	3	28	2	33	14	128
Total		11	8	27	9	20	13	35	4	39	25	191

Simple taboo agreement

radical * Emotion2 Crosstabulation

Count

		Emotion2										Total
		humiliation	pride	sadness	happiness	dissatisfaction	satisfaction	digust	guilt	anger	neutral	
radical	0	1	5	13	2	9	5	1	0	4	19	59
	1	7	3	13	1	23	3	31	1	30	15	127
Total		8	8	26	3	32	8	32	1	34	34	186

Taboo agreement with financial benefits

This indicates that the nature of radical political thinking existent concerning violence in this context is quite different from the one existent in other conflict zones, such as Palestine (see discussion above).

South Africa

We had constant problems in obtaining ethical approval in South Africa—the IRB to which we applied for ethical approval again and again asked for more and more details about the research, as if they were suspicious about people from outside South Africa doing research in their inter-ethnic conflict. After too many delays in getting final approval, and having in mind the fact that we would also need IRB approval in the US (which, from what we had learned from our experience with getting US IRB approval related for NI, is not straightforward and takes time), it became clear to us that we could not pursue the research on the conflict between Blacks and Afrikaners as we had initially planned. For this reason, we concentrated our research on the Northern Ireland context, instead. However, because of the established collaboration with South African researchers, we have shared our research materials with them, and they are now pursuing similar lines of inquiry that should contribute to the aims of this basic research project.

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APPENDIX 1

Phase 1 (Survey Structure)

In this phase, the same survey will be distributed to all participants (for participants' selection, see section 4). Most questions of this survey are open questions probing sacred values. However, questions 8 to 11 are about specific values that the current literature suggests may be considered to be sacred (Liechty & Clegg, 2001; Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey, 2010)**.**

Instructions

* Please read these instructions very carefully.

* In the following questions, we are interested in anything related to the conflict between Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland **[Afrikaners and Blacks in South Africa]** that may be considered to be so important to some people that they would never be willing to give them up, no matter how great the benefits. In other words, we are interested in anything that is seen as non-negotiable.

These can be things that one already has and would try to protect or things one does not have but would want to gain. For example, in other contexts, some citizens might consider that the old growth forest in their city is so important that they would never support cutting its trees down, even if this is to build a subway that will substantially improve the quality of life of everyone in the city; or, some animal-right defenders would never give up the aim of abolishing medical testing on animals, even if the results of these tests lead to discoveries that save many human lives.

* Please read the questions carefully and answer them thoroughly.

* Please keep these instructions in mind while answering the survey questions.

1.1. Please list two important things related to the Northern Ireland conflict **[South Africa conflict]** that you, personally, would never be willing to give up, no matter how great the benefits. If, for you, there is no such a thing, please skip to question 1.3.

(1st thing) ……………..

(2nd thing) ……………..

Why would you never be willing to give them up?

(1st thing) Because ……………

(2nd thing) Because ……………

When you think about giving up these things, what feelings/emotions come to your mind? Choose the two options that best describe your feelings/emotions if you had (Options: Humiliation, Pride, Sadness, Happiness, Dissatisfaction, Satisfaction, Disgust, Guilt, Anger, Neutral)

(1st thing) First emotion ----------------- 		Second emotion -------------------

(2nd thing) First emotion ----------------- 		Second emotion -------------------

1.2. Please look at the things that you listed above. Do you think anybody else from Northern Ireland **[from South Africa]** would disagree with you?

Yes (1)   No (2)

If yes, who and what about?

…………………

1.3. Please list two things related to the Northern Ireland conflict **[South Africa conflict]** that Protestants (or at least some Protestants) **[Afrikaners (or at least some Afrikaners)]** would never be willing to give up, no matter how great the benefits. You may repeat things related to your answers to the first two questions.

(1st thing) ……………..

(2nd thing) ……………..

Why would these Protestants **[Afrikaners]** never be willing to give them up?

(1st thing) Because ……………

(2nd thing) Because ……………

When these Protestants **[Afrikaners]** think about giving up these things, what feelings/emotions do you think come to their minds? Choose the two options that best describe their feeling/emotions (Options: Humiliation, Pride, Sadness, Happiness, Dissatisfaction, Satisfaction, Disgust, Guilt, Anger, Neutral)

(1st thing) First emotion -----------------   Second emotion -------------------

(2nd thing) First emotion -----------------   Second emotion -------------------

1.4. Some people say that at least some Protestants **[Afrikaners]** would feel justified in using violence to guarantee the things that are important to them concerning the Northern Ireland conflict **[South Africa conflict]**. Do you think there are things that some Protestants **[Afrikaners]** would be willing to use violence to guarantee?

Yes (1) No (2)

If yes, what about and why? You may include things or aims that you listed in the previous question.

…………………

1.5. Please list two things related to the Northern Ireland conflict **[South Africa conflict]** that Catholics (or at least some Catholics) **[Blacks (or at least some Blacks)]** would never be willing to give up, no matter how great the benefits. You may repeat things related to your answers to the first two questions.

(1st thing) …………………

(2nd thing) …………………

Why would these Catholics **[Blacks]** never be willing to give them up?

(1st thing) Because ……………..

(2nd thing) Because ……………..

When these Catholics **[Blacks]** think about giving up these things, what feelings/emotions do you think come to their minds? Choose the two options that best describe their feeling/emotions (Options: Humiliation, Pride, Sadness, Happiness, Dissatisfaction, Satisfaction, Disgust, Guilt, Anger, Neutral)

(1st thing) First emotion -----------------   Second emotion ------------------

(2nd thing) First emotion -----------------   Second emotion ------------------

1.6. Some people say that at least some Catholics **[Blacks]** would feel justified in using violence to guarantee the things that are important to them concerning the Northern Ireland conflict **[South Africa conflict]**. Do you think there are things that some Catholics **[Blacks]** would be willing to use violence to guarantee?

Yes (1)   No (2)

If yes, what about and why? You may include things that you listed in the previous question.

………………….

1.7. Keeping in mind things that might be non-negotiable for (at least some) Protestants and Catholics **[Afrikaners and Blacks]**, please try to think about how important they are for each side, and try to pair two things that are important for (at least some) Protestants **[Afrikaners]** with two things that are equally important for (at least some) Catholics **[Blacks]**. They do not have to be about the same topic. They should just be roughly equally important for both. For instance, in relation to another context, Americans disagree about a number of issues, including access to health care and the right to own guns. If an American was doing this survey, they might say, "It is just as important to American Liberals that everyone has access to health care as it is for American Conservatives that everyone has the right to own guns." Please list two pairs of examples for Protestants and Catholics **[Afrikaners and Blacks]** below.

	Things very important for Protestants	Things equally important for Catholics
Pair 1		
Pair 2		

	Things very important for Afrikaners	**Things equally important for Blacks**
Pair 1		
Pair 2		

1.8. How would you feel if it were decided that Protestants **[Afrikaners]** would have to permanently give up the right to have Northern Ireland as part of the UK **[…]**?

A. It would be totally acceptable.
B. I would not object to this.
C. It would be acceptable only if the benefits were great enough.
D. It wouldn't be acceptable no matter how great the benefits.
E. It wouldn't be acceptable no matter how great the benefits and I feel that Protestants would be justified in using violence against this decision.

Please explain why you chose this option.

………………..

1.9. How would you feel if it were decided that Catholics **[Blacks]** would have to permanently give up the right to unite Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland **[…]**?

A. It would be totally acceptable.
B. I would not object to this.
C. It would be acceptable only if the benefits were great enough.
D. It wouldn't be acceptable no matter how great the benefits.
E. It wouldn't be acceptable no matter how great the benefits and I feel that Protestants would be justified in using violence against this decision.

Please explain why you chose this option.

………………..

1.10. How would you feel if it were decided that Protestants **[Afrikaners]** would have to permanently give up the right to the Orange parades in July **[…]**?

A. It would be totally acceptable.
B. I would not object to this.
C. It would be acceptable only if the benefits were great enough.
D. It wouldn't be acceptable no matter how great the benefits.
E. It wouldn't be acceptable no matter how great the benefits and I feel that Protestants would be justified in using violence against this decision.

Please explain why you chose this option.

………………..

1.11. How would you feel if it were decided that Catholics would have to permanently give up the right to the St. Patrick's Day parades?

A. It would be totally acceptable.
B. I would not object to this.
C. It would be acceptable only if the benefits were great enough.
D. It wouldn't be acceptable no matter how great the benefits.
E. It wouldn't be acceptable no matter how great the benefits and I feel that Protestants would be justified in using violence against this decision.

Please explain why you chose this option.

………………..

1.12. How would you feel if it were decided that people in Northern Ireland **[South Africa]** would have to permanently give up the right to religious primary education in Northern Ireland **[South Africa]** would become completely secular (i.e. non-religious)?

A. It would be totally acceptable.
B. I would not object to this.
C. It would be acceptable only if the benefits were great enough.
D. It wouldn't be acceptable no matter how great the benefits.
E. It wouldn't be acceptable no matter how great the benefits and I feel that people in Northern Ireland would be justified in using violence against this decision.

Please explain why you chose this option.

……………………

1.13. Which type of leader (e.g. religious, community, political leaders etc.) would you really trust to negotiate issues related to the conflict in Northern Ireland **[South Africa]**?

……………………

Please explain why you trust this type of leader.

……………………

1.14. Which type of leader (e.g. religious, community, political leaders etc.) would Protestants really trust to negotiate issues related to the conflict in Northern Ireland **[South Africa]**?

……………………

Please explain why Protestants **[Afrikaners]** trust this type of leader.

……………………

1.15. Which type of leader (e.g. religious, community, political leaders etc.) would Catholics really trust to negotiate issues related to the conflict in Northern Ireland **[South Africa]**?

……………………

Please explain why Catholics **[Blacks]** trust this type of leader.

……………………

1.15. Do you feel that you or family are in danger because of the Northern Ireland **[South Africa]**conflict?

(ranging from 1 "strongly disagree" to 7 "strongly agree")

1.16. Have you and your family felt that you were in danger in the past because of the Northern Ireland **[South Africa]** conflict?

(ranging from 1 "strongly disagree" to 7 "strongly agree")

1.17. Do you feel that other members of your community are in danger because of the Northern Ireland **[South Africa]** conflict?

(ranging from 1 "strongly disagree" to 7 "strongly agree")

1.18. Thank you for answering our questions. Would you like to give us any additional feedback about these issues or about this survey?

……………………

APPENDIX 2

Phase Two

Survey General Structure

In this phase, we will run two independent surveys in each cultural context—one with Loyalists/Unionists and one with Republicans/Nationalists, for the Northern Ireland Context **[one with Afrikaners and one with Blacks, for the South Africa context]**. The overall design is a 2 (Participant Identity: Loyalists/Unionists vs. Republicans/Nationalists) x 2 (Strength of Attitude: Sacred vs. Not Sacred) x 2 (Value to give up: Two pairs of commensurable values) x 3 (Hypothetical political agreement: commensurable vs. commensurable plus financial benefits, commensurable plus symbolic benefits) between-subjects factorial. First, in order to check the strength of participants' attitudes in relation to the value they would have to give up in the hypothetical political agreement, we will probe whether the particular value at stake is sacred to them. Next, each participant will be presented with one of the four different types of hypothetical political agreements. After reading the hypothetical political agreement, each participant will answer a series of questions.

Survey Materials (Instruction and Participant Identity Question)

In this survey, you are going to read about some scenarios that we made up. We are interested in how important the issues at stake are for you. You do not have to evaluate what you think *would* happen if these plans were put in place. Instead, imagine that it is possible for the plans to work. This is an exercise.

**Note, each participant will be given ONE of the following scenarios

Please select which of the following you MOST identify with:

    A. Loyalist
    B. Republican
    C. Unionist
    D. Nationalist

Click here if you do not identify with any of the above at all. [ ]

Survey Materials (Strength of Attitude Question and Trade-off Scenarios)

*Based on the answer to this question, the following questions will be adjusted, with survey 1 or 3 being given to people who answer A or C and survey 2 being given to participants who answer B or D. People who do not identify with A, B, C, or D will not be eligible for the study.

1: Loyalists/Unionists (Flags exchange)

1.1 How would you feel about the Irish tricolour being flown at the Belfast City Hall?

A. It would be totally acceptable.
B. I would not object to this.
C. It would be acceptable only if the benefits were great enough.
D. It wouldn't be acceptable no matter how great the benefits.

PS. Answer "D" indicates sacredness; answers "A", "B" and "C" indicate non-sacredness.

** ONE of the following trade-offs will be presented, at random

P (commensurable)

Suppose that a political agreement was organized between the Loyalist and Republican (alt. Unionist and Nationalist) communities in Northern Ireland. This was a difficult process and both sides had to give things up. Under this agreement:

a) Loyalists *(Unionists)* would allow the Irish tricolour to be flown daily at the Belfast City Hall.
b) On their part, Republicans *(Nationalists)* would allow the Union Flag to be flown daily at the City Hall.

P (commensurable plus financial benefits)

Suppose that a political agreement was organized between the Loyalist and Republican *(alt. Unionist and Nationalist)* communities in Northern Ireland. This was a difficult process and both sides had to give things up. Under this agreement:

a) Loyalists *(Unionist)* would allow the Irish tricolour to be flown daily at the Belfast City Hall.
b) On their part, Republicans *(Nationalists)* would allow the Union Flag to be flown daily at the City Hall.
c) In addition, as an incentive to come to a peace agreement, the United Nations offered to give each family in a Loyalist *(Unionists)* neighborhood in Northern Ireland £2,000 a year for 15 years in economic assistance.

P (commensurable plus symbolic benefits)

Suppose that a political agreement was organized between the Loyalist and Republican *(alt. Unionist and Nationalist)* communities in Northern Ireland. This was a difficult process and both sides had to give things up. Under this agreement:

a) Loyalists *(Unionists)* would allow the Irish tricolour to be flown daily at the Belfast City Hall.
b) On their part, Republicans *(Nationalists)* would allow the Union Flag to be flown daily at the City Hall.
c) In addition, Republicans *(Nationalists)* would apologize for all the wrongs done to the Protestants in Northern Ireland and thank them for all that they have done and given up to promote peace.

2: Republicans/Nationalists (Flags exchange)

How would you feel if it was made illegal to fly the Irish tricolour in public spaces in Northern Ireland?

A. It would be totally acceptable.
B. I would not object to this.
C. It would be acceptable only if the benefits were great enough.
D. It wouldn't be acceptable no matter how great the benefits.

PS. Answer "D" indicates sacredness; answers "A", "B" and "C" indicate non-sacredness.

** ONE of the following trade-offs will be presented, at random

P (commensurable)

Suppose that a political agreement was organized between the Republican and Loyalist *(alt. Nationalist and Unionist)* communities in Northern Ireland. This was a difficult process and both sides had to give things up. Under this agreement:

c) Republicans *(Nationalists)* would not be allowed to fly the Irish tricolour in public spaces
d) On their part, Loyalists *(Unionists)* would not be allowed to fly the Union Flag in public spaces.

P (commensurable plus financial benefits)

Suppose that a political agreement was organized between the Republican and Loyalist *(alt. Nationalist and Unionist)* communities in Northern Ireland. This was a difficult process and both sides had to give things up. Under this agreement:

d) Republicans *(Nationalists)* would not be allowed to fly the Irish tricolour in public spaces
e) On their part, Loyalists *(Unionists)* would not be allowed to fly the British flag in public spaces.
f) In addition, as an incentive to come to a peace agreement, the United Nations offered to give each family in a Republican *(Nationalist)* neighborhood in Northern Ireland £2,000 a year for 15 years in economic assistance.

P (commensurable plus symbolic benefits)

Suppose that a political agreement was organized between the Republican and Loyalist *(alt. Nationalist and Unionist)* communities in Northern Ireland. This was a difficult process and both sides had to give things up. Under this agreement:

d) Republicans *(Nationalists)* would not be allowed to fly the Irish tricolour in public spaces

e) On their part, Loyalists *(Unionists)* would not be allowed to fly the Union Flag in public spaces.

f) In addition, Loyalists *(Unionists)* would apologize for all the wrongs done to the Catholics in Northern Ireland.

Survey Materials (Main Questions)

Would you find this political agreement acceptable?

Certainly No (1), No (2), Don't Know (3), Yes (4), Certainly Yes (5)

When you think about this political agreement, what feelings/emotions come to your mind? Choose the two options that best describe your feelings (Options: Humiliation, Pride, Sadness, Happiness, Dissatisfaction, Satisfaction, Disgust, Guilt, Anger, Neutral)

First option ----------------- Second option -------------------

What is your best guess of the percentage of Loyalists (Republicans) who would be in favour of this political agreement?

------------------ (note percentage).

Do you think this political agreement could be peacefully and successfully implemented?

Certainly No (1), No (2), Don't Know (3), Yes (4), Certainly Yes (5)

How justified do you think that Loyalists (Republicans) would be in using violence to fight this political agreement?

Completely unjustified (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9) Completely justified

Survey Materials (Follow-up Questions)

Please indicate how much you agree with the following statements

1.15. My family and I are in danger because of the Northern Ireland conflict.

(ranging from 1 "strongly disagree" to 7 "strongly agree")

1.16. My family and I have felt that we were in danger in the past because of the Northern Ireland conflict.

(ranging from 1 "strongly disagree" to 7 "strongly agree")

1.17. I feel that other members of my community are in danger because of the Northern Ireland conflict.

(ranging from 1 "strongly disagree" to 7 "strongly agree")

1.18. Thank you for answering our questions. Would you like to give us any additional feedback about these issues or about this survey?

……………………

Survey Materials (Demographic Information and Religiosity and Ritual Measures)

Please indicate your:

2.1. Gender: ( ) Male ( ) Female

2.2. Age: ( ) 18-25 ( ) 26-35 ( ) 36-45 ( ) 46-55 ( ) 56₊

2.3. Education level: ( ) Primary ( ) Secondary ( ) Some College ( ) Some University ( ) College Degree ( ) University Degree

2.4. Household Annual income: ( ) £0 to £10,000 ( ) £10,000 to £20,000 ( ) £20,000 to £40,000 ( ) £40,000 to £70,000 ( ) £70,000 or more

2.5. Marital status: ( ) married ( ) single ( ) divorced ( ) widowed ( ) separated

2.6. Political affiliation: ( ) DUP ( ) Sinn Fein ( ) SDLP ( ) UUP ( ) PUP ( ) Alliance ( ) None
 ( )Other _____

2.7. Religion: ( ) Protestant ( ) Catholic ( ) Other _____

2.8. How important is religion in your life?
(ranging from 1 "not important at all" to 7 "extremely important")

2.9. How often do you pray?
1 (never) 2(rarely) 3(once a week) 4(more than once a week) 5(daily) 6 (multiple times a day)

2.10. How often do you go to church?
1(never) 2(rarely) 3(once a month) 4(once a week) 5(more than once a week) 6(once a day)

2.11. Please select each of the following community activities that you participate in (Music group, Sport group, Community Service group, Fitness group, Educational group, Discussion group, Social group)

A follow-up question will be generated for each of the activities that the participant selects.

You said that you participate in a _____.
What is the focus of this group?
How often do you participate in this group activity?
Think about the other members of this group. What percentage of them do you think share your ethnic/religious background? (For instance, if you are a Protestant, what percentage of members in your group are Protestant and share your basic background?)

If you participate in any other community activities, please describe them below. We would like to know:

-What the group is/does

-How often you participate in the group activity

-What percentage of the members of this group share your ethnic/religious background. For instance, if you are a Protestant, what percentage of the members of your group are Protestant and share your basic background?

Participant Profiles and Sampling Techniques

Northern Ireland Context

Northern Irish people hold diverse political opinions. Ideas and strength of attitude about those ideas are not distributed randomly. As this study relies on the diversity of opinion (in particular, on radical opinions), it will be essential to target diverse groups of people in terms of what they think, and how strongly they hold those opinions. Particularly, we will attempt to recruit radical and non-radical Protestants, which are associated with loyalism and unionism, respectively, and radical and non-radical Catholics, which are associated with republicanism and nationalism, respectively. (See table below for relevant groups and areas.)

Adapted from Lichtey & Clegg (2001) Forms of Sectarianism in Northern Ireland

Identity	Likelihood of Radicalism	Religious	Political	Party/Group	Geographical Locations
Protestants	Higher	Fundamentalist and evangelical Protestant	Loyalist	Democratic Unionist Party Progressive Unionist Party Ulster Democratic Party Ulster Defence Association	North East of NI Derry, Carrickfergus Shankill area of Belfast
	Lower	Liberal Protestant and ecumenical	Unionist	Ulster Unionist Party	
Catholics	Higher	Conservative Catholic	Republican	Sinn Fein Provisional IRA	South West of NI Falls Road, Belfast
	Lower	Liberal Catholic	Nationalist	Social Democratic and Labour Party	

South Africa Context

In a similar way, we are going to target radical and non-radical Afrikaners and Blacks in South Africa based on the longitudinal data gathered through the Afrobarometer, an African-led series of national public attitude surveys, as well as by targeting known extremist separatist groups, such as the Boer Nationalists, white separatist towns, and Kommandokorps training camps and graduates (Afrobarometer, 2010; Mattes, 2011).